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behalf. 10 Generally, courts apply the rule where a third party makes a gratuitous payment or an insurance company pays medical expenses on behalf of the plaintiff.
11
Insurance and government benefits have significantly complicated the collateral source rule's application;
12 their establishment has led courts to inconsistently apply the rule where Medicare, Medicaid, or private insurance companies have contracted for a write-off with medical service providers. 13 In these write-off agreements, medical service providers write off a contractually agreed-upon amount, and Medicare, Medicaid, or the private insurance company pays only a portion of the original amount billed by the medical service provider.
14 Thus, an issue remains unanswered: Does the collateral source rule limit the plaintiff to economic damages equal to the amount paid 15 by Medicaid or Medicare, or does it entitle the plaintiff to the amount originally billed by the medical service provider? 16 Plaintiffs and defendants steadfastly argue 15. For purposes of clarity, this Comment attempts to use two terms to refer to the possible amounts recoverable by plaintiffs in this scenario. First, the plaintiff may recover the "actual amount paid" by his or her medical service provider or $35,000. Second, the plaintiff may recover the "original amount billed" by his or her medical service provider or $50,000.
16. See Rose I, 78 P.3d at 802 (noting that the defendant argued the "trial court should have limited the evidence of medical expenses to those amounts actually paid, without including the amounts it wrote off"). Cases where the tortfeasor is both the defendant and the medical service provider further complicate a court's ability to allocate damages under the collateral source rule and write-off frameworks. Usually, this occurs when the plaintiff is injured due to the medical service provider's negligence. E.g., id. at 806 (Luckert, J., dissenting) (noting that where the tortfeasor is the medical service provider, the collateral source cannot be "wholly independent of and collateral to the wrongdoer"). In these cases, both the defendant and the plaintiff have contracted with Medicare or Medicaid. The defendant hospital's contract establishes a fee schedule by which the medical service provider agrees to charge Medicare or Medicaid, and the plaintiff's insurance contract entitles the plaintiff to the benefits contracted for by the defendant. This Comment does not address this specific issue: the rule's purposes do not apply to this situation, and the Kansas Supreme Court has already settled it. See Rose v. Via Christi Health Sys., Inc. (Rose II), 113 P.3d 241, 248 (Kan. 2005) (holding that where the tortfeasor is both the defendant and the medical service provider, the trial court may allow "a setoff or credit against the portion of the economic loss attributable to KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 55 that a ruling against one will constitute a windfall for the other. Tortfeasors typically stress that courts must not allow plaintiffs to receive write-offs because no one has incurred the costs. Generally, the plaintiff responds that courts relieving tortfeasors from liability effectively grant tortfeasors undeserved windfalls.
17
The Kansas collateral source rule's application to write-offs has particularly confused practitioners. 18 Seeking to clarify this murky area of the law, the Kansas legislature recently attacked the rule for a fourth time. 19 Had Senate Bill 335 20 passed, Kansas would have become the fifteenth state to eradicate its rule. 21 Although the bill did not survive legislative muster, 22 at least one commentator has questioned the bill's practicality and constitutionality. 23 Regardless, Kansas's legislative and judicial struggles with "write-off law" offer important lessons for both future Kansas legislation and states considering action in this area.
This Comment strives to learn from these lessons. Part II describes related legal concepts, 24 discusses other states' approaches to the writeoff question, 25 explains the relevant historical background on the Kansas collateral source rule's inception and proposed abrogation, 26 and illustrates the legal ambivalence of the Kansas collateral source rule's applicability to Medicare and Medicaid write-offs. 27 Part III applies the medical expenses in the amount of the Medicare write-off, an amount not paid by the plaintiff, Medicare, or any third party, and which reflected a cost incurred by the defendant"). 17. See, e.g., Mobile Infirmary Med. Ctr. v. Hodgen, 884 So. 2d 801, 817 (Ala. 2003) (contrasting these competing arguments). Economic theory underlies the idea that the tortfeasor receives a windfall if the court releases him from liability. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 201 (4th ed. 1992 ). In theory, deterrence and accountability possess an economic value. Allowing the defendant to escape full liability theoretically results in less deterrence and accountability than the tortfeasor would have otherwise been subject to. Id. 18. See infra Part II.C (explaining the uncertainty in Kansas write-off law Additionally, Part III critically analyzes three general answers developed by sister jurisdictions 29 and, anticipating further challenges to the collateral source rule, analyzes the constitutionality of a bill abrogating the rule. 30 Ultimately, this Comment proposes three arguments, all dependent on a single premise: defendant deterrence and accountability constitute the primary policy rationales underlying the Kansas collateral source rule. 31 First, the rule's twin policies direct courts to apply the collateral source rule to write-offs. 32 Second, Kansas courts will respect the rule's policies only by adopting a reasonable-value approach and awarding the original amount billed by the medical service provider. 33 However, this does not imply the Kansas Constitution necessarily shields the rule 34 -hence this Comment's last argument: contrary to many commentators' opinions, an attempt to abrogate the Kansas rule may withstand constitutional scrutiny under a rational basis standard of review.
35
Leaving the rule's fate to a political process not necessarily obstructed by the Kansas Constitution, the Kansas legislature can in fact decide whether its collateral source rule stays or goes.
II. BACKGROUND
A brief history of the collateral source rule helps one understand how the establishment of government benefits and private insurance, especially the consequent write-offs from medical service providers, has 28 Id. An example should clarify this principle. Assume defendant, D, negligently caused an accident and injured plaintiff, P. P's medical expenses amount to $100,000, and P's insurance company pays the full amount. Through subrogation, D (or D's insurance company) now owes $100,000 to P's insurance company, not to P. Thus, P's insurance company is the subrogee, and P is the subrogor. When P's insurance company pays P's medical expenses, P's insurance company acquires P's right to collect the money from D. KANSAS and tortfeasor accountability. 55 In the medical insurance context, 56 the insurer's right to exert this principle depends on a policy provision providing for subrogation. However, unlike private insurance, the controlling statutes of Medicare and Medicaid grant these programs an automatic right of subrogation. 57 
The Problem
To illustrate the issue addressed by this Comment, assume a tortfeasor negligently injures a plaintiff, and the plaintiff consequently incurs medical expenses. The medical service provider initially bills the plaintiff $50,000. The plaintiff is a beneficiary of Medicare, and this program previously negotiated a $15,000 write-off with the medical service provider for the plaintiff's services. Thus, the actual amount paid by Medicare to the medical service provider is $35,000. The plaintiff then sues the tortfeasor asserting economic damages of $50,000, the amount originally billed by the medical service provider. Medicare reserves a statutory right to subrogate the amount actually paid, $35,000.
58 At issue is thus whether the tortfeasor will bear the additional $15,000 burden or whether the court will allow the tortfeasor to introduce evidence of the $15,000 write-off to effectively limit the plaintiff's damages to $35,000.
If the court allows the plaintiff to receive the $15,000 write-off, then the $15,000 burden falls on the defendant. Although the plaintiff pockets $15,000, the court subjects the defendant to the full extent of his liability. The benefit-of-the-bargain approach allows a plaintiff to recover the full value of her medical expenses, including the write-off, if she has paid consideration for her benefit.
70
Bozeman v. State 71 provides an example. There, the Louisiana Supreme Court held that a Medicaid recipient could not collect Medicaid write-offs because he had neither personally bargained for the benefit nor paid the premiums. 72 In contrast, plaintiffs who have bargained for insurance enjoy entitlement to the benefit of their bargain and may recover the original amount billed by their medical service provider.
73
This rendition of the benefit-of-the-bargain approach oversimplifies its nature. Courts adopting this rationale significantly differ in the approach's implementation. The differences arise from the courts' perspectives of Medicare and Medicaid requirements; the key here is the court's view of whether the plaintiff actually paid any consideration for either of these two programs. Subscribing to this approach, for example, 
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and concluded that plaintiffs who pay premiums for Medicare benefits are entitled to the benefit of their bargain.
77
The Kansas District Court adopted the opposite extreme in Wildermuth v. Staton.
78
That case presented the issue of whether plaintiffs are entitled to Medicare benefits. 79 Although beneficiaries generally pay a premium for Medicare benefits, 80 the court allowed the defendants to introduce evidence of the write-off, thereby effectively limiting the plaintiff's recovery to the actual amount paid by Medicare. The court reasoned that the write-offs did not constitute a benefit the plaintiffs personally obtained or for which they individually bargained. 81 Instead, according to the court, federal law required the write-offs, and Medicare law and regulations prohibit medical service providers from seeking reimbursement for the write-offs from anyone. 82 Thus, the court refused to award the Medicare write-off to the plaintiff. Courts generally offer two reasons for allowing defendants to introduce evidence of write-offs. First, because neither the plaintiff nor anyone else incurred the cost of the write-offs, the defendant ought to not incur the loss. Expanding on this point, a Kansas court opined that allowing the plaintiff to receive the write-off is to fabricate a false presumption that the write-off constitutes a "payment." Medicaid is a system for providing payment of medical costs to the poor. Neither the beneficiary nor his employer pays premiums or underwrites the cost of the program. . . . Payment into the [Medicare] trust fund, though involuntary, is in exchange for health care coverage, and gives rise to a duty on the part of the government to pay benefits when required. In addition, the language of the statute specifically refers to "policy or contract" of insurance. In short, Medicare Part A is funded by payments made by beneficiaries and their employers, is actuarily determined, and is described by its enabling statute as insurance. U.S. district courts in Kansas have expressly adopted these two rationales. In Wildermuth, a case involving Medicare, the court offered two rationales when rejecting a distinction between Medicare and Medicaid as a basis for allowing the plaintiff to recover the write-off. First, the court emphasized the collateral source rule's language, noting that "the collateral source rule, by its express terms, simply does not apply to write-offs of expenses that are never paid."
86 Second, the court justified its approach with the windfall rationale: "allowing a plaintiff to recover the amount of charges written-off would result in a windfall to the plaintiff." Reasonableness as a standard has permeated American jurisprudence since its inception, and the collateral source rule has not escaped the standard's reach.
In answering the write-off question, several jurisdictions use a reasonable-value approach, through which the court awards plaintiffs only the reasonable value of the medical expenses.
90
Ascertaining the definition of "reasonable value" presents the most troubling question regarding this approach. 91 Courts primarily interpret this term of art in three fashions. First, the reasonable value of the services represents the full amount of the services, including the write- 
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offs. 92 Second, converse to the first variation, the reasonable value of the services does not include the write-off. 93 Third, both the amounts originally billed by the medical service provider and actually paid by the insurance company help fact finders calculate the reasonable value of the plaintiff's medical expenses.
94

B. The Collateral Source Rule
Having outlined the intricacies and relevant considerations of the write-off issue, this Subpart in part provides information necessary to understand whether the collateral source rule even applies to write-offs. This Subpart begins with the rule's history 95 and subsequently describes the Kansas legislature's attempts to modify and abrogate the collateral source rule. 96 An understanding of the rule's beginnings and its troubled history is vital to a sound constitutional analysis of the Kansas legislature's attempts to abrogate the collateral source rule. See id. at 1161 (holding plaintiffs are entitled to recover the reasonable value of the medical services, and that this is the amount paid by the insurance company plus the write-off). Perhaps, Bynum ought to be referred to as a "full-amount" approach. The decision adduces two persuasive arguments. First, the court used a syllogism: the collateral source rule allows plaintiffs to recover gratuitous payments; the write-off is a gratuitous payment by the physician to the plaintiff; therefore, the plaintiff should recover the write-off. Id. at 1156. Second, the court explained that "no precedent is overturned inasmuch as the issue at hand has not been decided in this jurisdiction. Indeed, none of the parties argue that a decision such as this one, consistent with other decisions reaching the same or similar results, would result in overturning Hawai'i law. courts have often adopted various rationales to explain the collateral source rule. According to some jurisdictions, the rule applies because courts should not force plaintiffs to transfer to tortfeasors the benefit of their bargain. 103 The Tenth Circuit recognizes two additional rationales. First, if either a windfall must fall on the tortfeasor or the plaintiff must receive a double recovery, then public policy demands that courts not reward the tortfeasor for the plaintiff's good fortune.
104 Second, the rule encourages maintenance of insurance by assuring plaintiffs' payments from collateral sources will not be reduced.
105
Most important for purposes of this Comment's thesis, other courts emphasize the collateral source rule's deterrent value. 107 Berry involved a wrongful death action brought by a mother who received a financial benefit resulting from her son's death. 108 The defendant argued that the trial court should have deducted the benefit from the verdict. 109 Upholding the damages amount, the court called the defendant's argument "untenable" 110 
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further explanation, that the proposition "does not address itself to the judgment of this court as being sound, legal, equitable, or fair." 111 Thus, the Berry court did not adopt deterrence or accountability as the rationales of its decision.
The rationale adopted by Kansas courts has since evolved. Berry began with fairness, though the Berry court itself failed to answer why the collateral source rule produces "fair" results. 112 Subsequent case law demonstrates the evolution of the fairness rationale. Today, the Kansas collateral source rule's underlying policies are twofold: accountability and deterrence. 113 The idea that courts must hold the defendant liable for the full amount of damages he causes underlies the accountability policy. 114 A tortfeasor unjustifiably escapes responsibility unless the collateral source rule holds him accountable.
115
Kansas courts also generally emphasize the collateral source rule's deterrent value. These courts assume that a tortfeasor's knowledge that the plaintiff's insurance company will pay for the damages may diminish the tortfeasor's incentive to act reasonably. 126. The Kansas Supreme Court applied a heightened level of scrutiny because of the nature of the rights involved. In justifying its choice of constitutional scrutiny, the court gave the following hypothetical about two patients:
One is wealthy, and has insurance, while the other has no resources to pay for medical care and is uninsured. The first is able to retain private nursing care, which is paid for by the insurance, while the second, needing the same continual care, is cared for by his wife, who was forced to quit her job to stay home and care for him. It is said the modified collateral source rule would exclude evidence that the private nursing care for the first patient was in fact paid for by the insurance company, while the jury would be apprised of the fact that the second patient's care was provided free by his wife, and perhaps she had been earning only the minimum wage at the job she left. Sections 60-3801 to -3807 encountered a similar fate. According to these statutes, where a personal injury claimant sought more than $150,000 in damages, "evidence of collateral source benefits received or evidence of collateral source benefits which are reasonably expected to be received in the future shall be admissible."
140 Sections 60-3801 to -3807 authorized the claimant to introduce evidence of the cost of the collateral sources and required the trier of fact to reduce the judgment by the amount of the collateral source benefits minus the benefits' cost. 143 This time using a rational basis standard of review, the court explained that "[e]ven assuming the objective of cutting insurance costs is a legitimate legislative goal, . . . the only basis for the [$150,000] classification is to deny a benefit to one group for no purpose other than to discriminate against that group."
144
As such, the classification represents an "arbitrary" and thus unconstitutional attempt by the legislature. The Kansas legislature recently attempted to abrogate the collateral source rule in all personal injury claims, 146 a move that could have significantly altered Kansas personal injury law. Section 1 of the bill proposes to abrogate the rule in "any action," regardless of the plaintiff's damages.
147 Section 2 amends the previous statute to allow, but not require, fact finders to calculate the net collateral source benefits.
148 If the jury is the fact finder, and the jury makes the calculation, the bill requires the jury to itemize its verdict. 149 In Bates, the plaintiff and defendant were involved in an accident. 165 Before trial, the defendant filed a motion in limine seeking to limit the plaintiff's evidence of economic damages to the amount paid by Medicaid on the plaintiff's behalf. 166 Reversing the trial court's grant of the motion, the appellate court firmly stated the collateral source rule did not apply to Medicaid write-offs. 167 Instead, because a medical service provider cannot charge Medicaid patients for the write-off, the actual amount paid by Medicaid constitutes the "customary charge" and thus constitutes the only amount recoverable by the plaintiff. 168 In the Medicare context, the write-off issue first arose in the Rose decisions. Bates and Rose shared similar facts, subject to two main distinctions: Rose involved Medicare, 169 and the Rose defendant played the roles of both tortfeasor and medical service provider. 170 In Rose, the decedent injured himself while under the defendant's care. 171 After this injury, the defendant hospital continued to treat the decedent. 172 The defendant hospital "billed [the decedent] and his insurer, Medicare, for 160 At trial, the plaintiff alleged the defendant hospital had been negligent in treating the decedent. 176 The court held in favor of the plaintiff on the negligence issue. 177 Similarly, the trial court determined that Bates was inapplicable to Medicare write-offs and admitted into evidence the defendant hospital's initial bill of $242,104.84.
178
On appeal, the Kansas Supreme Court considered whether the defendant hospital may introduce evidence of Medicare write-offs. 179 Distinguishing Rose from Bates (and thus distinguishing Medicare from Medicaid for purposes of write-off analysis), the appellate court held that the plaintiff should receive the write-off because he had bargained for the Medicare benefit.
180 Thereafter, the Kansas Supreme Court granted a motion to rehear Rose. In Fisher, the plaintiff sued her private insurance company after an accident in an attempt to recover under her policy's underinsured coverage provision. 184 Applying Bates, the trial court excluded evidence of the private insurance write-off. 185 The plaintiff appealed, but the appellate court affirmed, explaining that "the language employed in the Bates majority suggests that its holding 173 179. The defendant hospital filed a cross-appeal in the event the appellate court reversed the trial court's grant of the motion to offset. Rose I, 78 P.3d at 802. The write-off issue is the crux of the cross-appeal in Rose I.
180. See id. at 806 ("Because health care providers voluntarily contract with Medicare in the same manner as they contract with other private insurers for reduced rates, the benefit of the writeoffs should be attributed to the Medicare participant rather than the health care provider."). This distinction was based on a contractual, benefit-of-the-bargain, analysis: Medicare, unlike Medicaid, generally requires its beneficiaries to pay premiums. was not principally driven by the fact that the write-off was mandated by a Medicaid contract." 186 The same three-judge panel decided Liberty. In language almost verbatim to that in Fischer, 187 the Liberty court extended Bates to Medicare write-offs. 188 The Fischer and Liberty appellate court clearly expected the Kansas Supreme Court to answer the write-off question. 189 However, the Kansas Supreme Court did little to meet these expectations. Instead of solving this question, the court left the write-off issue undecided by limiting Rose II to cases where the tortfeasor plays the roles of both the defendant and the medical service provider. 190 In what one commentator has named a "disconnect between the Kansas Court of Appeals and the Kansas Supreme Court,"
191 the preceding cases set the groundwork for uncertainty. Presently, a defendant may introduce evidence of write-offs. Per Bates, the "amount due" is the actual amount paid because the medical service provider cannot charge Medicaid patients for the write-off. 192 Similarly, under Rose II, a defendant may introduce evidence of write-offs if the tortfeasor is both the defendant and the medical service provider. 193 While Rose I purported to limit Bates to Medicaid cases, 194 Rose II brings to question the precedential value of this distinction. 195 
Nevertheless, the Kansas Court of Appeals concluded in Fisher and
Liberty that Bates applies to all write-offs. 196 The court further noted that the actual amount paid constitutes the reasonable value. 197 Taking these decisions at face value, their practical result is simple: if the collateral source rule is inapposite to all write-offs, and the reasonable value of the services comprises the actual amount paid to the medical service provider, then no plaintiff may recover more than the actual amount paid to the medical service provider.
198
The history, approaches, and details of the collateral source rule in the Medicare and Medicaid contexts highlight the rule's complications. Making effective use of these tools, Kansas must mold a rule that will respect both the rule's policies and the Kansas Constitution.
III. ANALYSIS
Kansas courts have blatantly ignored the collateral source rule's policies. Absent a consideration of the policies underlying the collateral source rule, the application of any of the three approaches yields a legal rule improperly divorced from its roots. This is exactly the type of rule Kansas courts have sired-the rationale that courts should not hold defendants fully liable merely because neither the defendant nor his insurance company incurred the loss carelessly disrespects the rule's purpose.
Specifically underlie the Kansas collateral source rule, the rule applies to write-offs regardless of whether anyone has paid them. 199 Second, a corollary of the first argument, the rule's policies demand a reasonable-value approach that allows courts to award plaintiffs the original amount billed by their medical service providers. 200 Third, responding to a commentator's constitutional challenges to Senate Bill 335, 201 this Part concludes that the Kansas legislature possesses the constitutional authority to abrogate the collateral source rule. 202 However, in order to show that the collateral source rule is not bullet-proof, this Part ultimately discusses suggestions to strengthen legislative attempts to abrogate the rule against constitutional challenges.
203
A. Deterrence and Punishment: A Top-Down Approach to the Kansas
Collateral Source Rule
A Theoretical Framework
Many note that the plaintiff has received an undeserved windfall at the defendant's expense if the court includes a write-off in the plaintiff's damages award. 204 Why, in other words, should the tortfeasor pay the plaintiff damages that neither he nor anyone else incurred?
205 After all, the collateral source rule states that "payments from a collateral source shall not diminish the damages otherwise recoverable from the wrongdoer." 206 Two policy prongs generally compose the counterargument. First, courts should not relieve the defendant from liability merely because no one paid the benefit. Second, if either the defendant or the plaintiff must receive a windfall, justice demands that the plaintiff-not the defendant-profit from the collateral source. 207 A more sound and less hasty response would look to the rule's foundation, seeking to determine the purpose of the rule and applying that purpose to the facts at issue. One might then pose the question: Does the purpose of the collateral source rule suggest either the defendant's conduct or the defendant herself should be covered? If so, then the collateral source rule should apply, notwithstanding any technicalities in the manner of payment or the collateral source's language itself. If not, then the court should not apply the collateral source rule to the defendant or her conduct and should, instead, allow her to introduce evidence of the collateral source's benefit or payment to the plaintiff.
Much like original intent constitutional analysis, this framework allows practitioners to see a rule from the "top," or the policy, and apply that policy "down," or to the facts. 208 This framework requires academics and practitioners to determine the collateral source rule's rationales. Courts generally advance two justifications, the first based on deterrence and accountability, 209 and the second based on a benefit-of-the-bargain theory. 210 Additionally, some commentators suggest a hidden function of the rule-"to assist plaintiffs' attorneys in financing lawsuits, since deducting insurance proceeds or government benefits from damages would reduce the size of the contingency fees available." 
Wildermuth v. Staton
215 provides an example of this payment rationale. There, the Kansas District Court extended Bates to Medicare write-offs and justified its decision on the lack of payment. 216 The court concluded that, because no one paid for the write-off, the collateral source rule did not entitle the plaintiff to receive Medicare write-offs. 217 Taken to its logical extreme, Wildermuth would likely extend Bates to private insurance write-offs, 218 thereby limiting a plaintiff's recovery to the actual amount paid to the medical service provider, regardless of the program at issue.
As a matter of policy, the payment distinction stands on thin ground.
219
Where the two primary policies underlying the Kansas collateral source rule are deterrence and accountability, 220 a third party's payments or lack thereof should not determine the defendant's liability. 217. Id. at *8. 218. A syllogism clarifies this point: the Wildermuth court's decision hinges on whether someone actually paid the write-off. Plaintiffs never pay write-offs, even when they are insured under private insurance; by definition, write-offs are written off. Thus, if payment is a precondition of an economic damages award, plaintiffs will never receive write-offs, regardless of the benefit program or insurance company.
219. Arguably, the Wildermuth court misinterpreted the language upon which it relied. In noting that the collateral source rule only excludes evidence "paid" by collateral sources, the Wildermuth court cited Wentling v. Medical Anesthesia Services, P.A., 701 P.2d 939 (Kan. 1985), a case where the Kansas Supreme Court declared the first legislative attempt to abrogate the collateral source rule unconstitutional. Id. at *5. In Wentling, the Kansas Supreme Court noted:
"The collateral source rule permits an injured party to recover full compensatory damages from a tortfeasor irrespective of the payment of any element of those damages by a source independent of the tortfeasor. The rule also precludes admission of evidence paid by a collateral source rule, except where such evidence clearly carries probative value on an issue not inherently related to measurement of damages." Wentling, 701 P.2d at 949 (emphasis added) (quoting 3 MINZER, NATES, KIMBALL, AXELROD & GOLDSTEIN, DAMAGES IN TORT ACTIONS § 17.00, at 17-5 (1984)).
Nevertheless, the Kansas District Court concluded that the plaintiff's receipt of the Medicare write-off depends on whether someone had actually paid the write-off. Wildermuth's adamant emphasis on the payment/nonpayment distinction directly contradicts the "irrespective of the payment" language of the Wentling court. Thus, Wildermuth's reliance on Wentling is misplaced.
220. See supra note 113.
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The payment distinction is arbitrary, particularly when viewed through a policy lens.
A policy look at the collateral source rule as applicable to gratuitous benefits clarifies this point. Assume the plaintiff in the above illustration 221 lacks insurance. Assume further that one of the plaintiff's relatives pays the plaintiff's medical bill. The collateral source rule demands the defendant pay the entire amount originally owed by the plaintiff to the medical service provider, notwithstanding the payment by the plaintiff's relative. However, if the plaintiff's relative obtains a discount from the medical service provider resulting from his own negotiation, the collateral source rule still demands the defendant pay the full amount. The policies of deterrence and accountability demand that the court not diminish the defendant's culpability by a third-party discount.
Indeed, Bates failed to consider the collateral source rule's policies. In Kansas, deterrence and accountability constitute the Kansas collateral source rule's two primary policies. 222 Thus, courts apply the collateral source rule under the assumption that deterrence embodies an important economic value. For example, if an insurance policy entitles A to receive $10,000 for an injury, and the defendant negligently injures A, under the collateral source rule A will receive $10,000 from the insurance policy and $10,000 from the defendant, provided A did not contractually subrogate his rights to the insurance company. 223 A policy of tortfeasor accountability also strengthens the plaintiff's case. 224 Whether the plaintiff's insurance company paid for the write-off is factually irrelevant to the defendant's culpability. The defendant's negligence or intent in causing the tort does not change merely because a plaintiff obtained insurance or health benefits. As with deterrence, the payment is inapposite to the defendant's culpability. To permit the defendant to set up [the plaintiff's] insurance policy as a bar to the action would result in underdeterrence. The economic cost of the accident, however defrayed, is $10,000, and if the judgment against him is zero, his incentive to spend up to $10,000 (discounted by the probability of occurrence) to prevent a similar accident in the future will be reduced. POSNER, supra note 17, at 201. 224. See supra note 113 (noting that accountability constitutes one of the collateral source rule's primary policies).
225. The analysis differs if the collateral source rule's desired function is, as some commentators have suggested, the assistance of plaintiffs and their attorneys in financing lawsuits. See supra note This does not imply the payment is irrelevant for all purposes. To most versions of the collateral source rule, the payment possesses legal weight insofar as it allows the fact finder to determine whether the payor, or the source of the benefit, is independent of the defendant. The facts in Rose 226 serve as an example. There, the hospital played the roles of both the defendant and the medical service provider.
227
Focusing on this factual distinction, the Rose II court noted that the collateral source rule only applies where the defendant and the payor are independent of each other.
228
B. An Analysis of the Three Approaches
Through lenses of deterrence and accountability, a top-down analysis leads to a single conclusion: A distinction between paid and unpaid write-offs is irrelevant because their payment or nonpayment does not alter the applicability of the deterrence and accountability policies to the defendant's liability. However, the notion that the collateral source rule applies to write-offs in the absence of a legislative enactment ordering otherwise does not end the legal inquiry. The question of whether the collateral source rule necessarily precludes defendants from introducing evidence of write-offs remains unanswered.
This question is crucial. Because its answer may be "no," this issue will ultimately determine whether the plaintiff receives them. If the collateral source rule, by mere virtue of its applicability, prohibits introduction of evidence of write-offs, then the plaintiff ought to recover the original amount billed by his medical service provider. Some courts have held the opposite. Even if applicable, these courts hold that the rule does not impose on the court a duty to award to the plaintiff the original 211 and accompanying text (describing the financing-litigation policy). If the policy starting point is the financing of litigation, then one cannot as easily make the case that the payment distinction is inapposite. Here, the plaintiff's recovery of the actual amount paid arguably consummates the financing-litigation policy. After all, once the plaintiff recovers an additional monetary amount-the double damages award-but does not receive the write-off, the plaintiff can much more easily finance the litigation. Viewed under this policy, a court that allows the plaintiff to receive the writeoff may often award the plaintiff more than the cost of litigation, thereby exceeding the purported benefit of the financing-litigation policy. However, courts generally do not subscribe to this policy. Even assuming that a court follows this rationale, the plaintiff's recovery of the original amount billed by the medical service provider would more strongly achieve the policy's purpose of aiding plaintiffs and their attorneys in financing litigation.
226. See supra notes 169─81 and accompanying text (discussing the relevant facts of the Rose decisions).
227. 
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amount billed by the medical service provider.
229
In addressing this question, courts have used three general approaches. 230 Of these, only the reasonable-value approach respects both the collateral source rule's underlying policies of accountability and deterrence and the Kansas Constitution.
1. Protect the Rich, and Forget the Poor: The Benefit-of-the-Bargain Approach's Shortcomings
Through the benefit-of-the-bargain approach, plaintiffs may recover the original amount billed by their medical service providers only if their healthcare benefits bear contractual consideration. 231 If, on the other hand, the benefits do not bear consideration, plaintiffs ought to recover only the actual amount paid to the medical service providers.
This approach has encountered significant opposition within the courts. This Comment emphasizes two of the approach's most piercing critiques. First, the approach irrationally discriminates among plaintiffs. Second, the approach could not survive scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause of the Kansas Constitution.
232
Because the Medicare and Medicaid premium structures differ significantly, 233 courts applying the benefit-of-the-bargain approach distinguish between the two programs. Courts generally agree that a plaintiff who receives Medicaid benefits has not bargained for those benefits and, thus, the collateral source rule does not entitle her to the write-off.
234
The same relative consistency does not hold true in Medicare cases. 235 Most jurisdictions conclude that a beneficiary who chooses Medicare has paid premiums and, therefore, the collateral source rule entitles such beneficiary to collect the unpaid amount. 236 In contrast, a minority holds that, although Medicare beneficiaries pay premiums, the 229. See supra Part II.A.3 (discussing the approaches different jurisdictions have taken in resolving the collateral source issue).
230. See id. (discussing the benefit-of-the-bargain approach, the actual-amount-paid approach, and the reasonable-value approach to dealing with write-offs).
231. See supra Part II.A.3.a (discussing the benefit-of-the-bargain approach to write-offs). 232. Here, the benefit-of-the-bargain approach, not the collateral source's abrogation, would likely violate the Equal Protection Clause. This Comment discusses the equal protection implications for the collateral source rule and proposes a solution to anticipated constitutional problems infra in Part III.D.
233. This approach complicates the write-off issue and unnecessarily creates ambiguities for parties to exploit. Even assuming that the collateral source rule generally entitles Medicare beneficiaries to receive the benefit of their bargain, a factual discussion reveals that, although courts adopting the benefit-of-the-bargain approach generally award Medicare beneficiaries the write-off, even Medicare beneficiaries seldom bargain for their benefit. The Medicare beneficiary does not necessarily pay a premium-in fact, Medicare beneficiaries may obtain their programs for free if they have little income or resources. 238 In these cases, the state pays the beneficiary's premiums and might, in some cases, even pay the beneficiary's deductibles and other medical expenses. If the difference between a plaintiff who can recover the write-off and one who cannot is whether he has actually bargained for a benefit, then even some Medicare recipients may not be entitled to the write-off. 239 An often criticized aspect of the benefit-of-the-bargain approach is its inherent discrimination among beneficiaries from different programs and insurance companies. Fischer clarifies this discrepancy. There, the court noted "[t]he principle of restoration should be applicable to all plaintiffs, regardless of whether they be uninsured, covered by Medicaid, covered by Medicare, covered by an employer's group health policy, or covered by an individually purchased private insurance contract."
240
Hence the constitutional problem: In Kansas this distinction may actually violate equal protection. The rationale that arbitrary discrimination among the injured violates the Kansas Constitution invalidates the benefit-of-the-bargain approach. Applying Wentling, if the legislature, in modifying the collateral source rule, intends to both lower liability insurance costs and limit the size of personal injury verdicts, then the distinction between plaintiffs with Medicaid and those with Medicare or private insurance does not further the legislature's purpose. 241 The practical discrimination makes the constitutional problem obvious: 237. Id. 238. See supra notes 46-49 (explaining Medicaid eligibility requirements). 239. Even in private insurance, an individual seldom bargains with the insurance company. The assumption that a plaintiff may actually bargain with the government or with a private insurance company is a fiction. Therefore, Kansas courts should not be captivated by the "fairness" and consistency mirage provided by the benefit-of-the-bargain approach.
240 In many courts, whether the plaintiff's insurance company has paid the write-off is critical. However, this distinction directly encroaches on the collateral source rule's policies of deterrence and accountability. 243 To place the result in terms of the rule's policies, a court allowing the plaintiff to only receive the actual amount paid to the medical service provider deters the defendant less than it would have otherwise and permits her to incur less of a loss than she would have but for the plaintiff's insurance or government benefits. The Kansas collateral source rule's twin policies compel the opposite result. In Koffman v. Leichtfuss, 245 the Wisconsin Supreme Court adopted the reasonable-value approach to address write-offs. The court adopted this approach for three reasons. First, applying "long-standing principles of Wisconsin law," 246 the court held a plaintiff may recover the reasonable value of the services rendered by his medical service provider; 247 the focus, the court noted, is "on the reasonable value, not the actual charge."
248 Second, the court noted that a plaintiff's damages 242. See supra notes 46-49 (posing Medicaid eligibility requirements). 243. Neither has the Kansas legislature weakened the rationales of the collateral source rule. At most, one may infer a desire to counter the perceived medical malpractice crisis from the legislature's previous modifications of the rule. One cannot with any certainty assume that the legislature seeks to weaken the policies of deterrence and accountability absent significant legislative history supporting its modifications of the rule or the abrogation of the collateral source rule. may not be reduced by third-party payments or benefits. 249 Third, the court relied on the insurer's right to subrogation, noting that because the insurer has a right to subrogation, the plaintiff will not attain a double recovery.
250
As long as policies of deterrence and accountability stand as the collateral source rule's pillars, Kansas should apply the reasonable-value approach and allow the plaintiff to receive the original amount billed by the medical service provider. Only in this situation does the burden fall where it should-on the defendant. Again, a look at the illustration in Part II.2 helps one understand this argument. The burden of the write-off must fall on someone. If the court allows the plaintiff to receive the $15,000 write-off, the burden falls on the defendant. Conversely, if the court denies the plaintiff the opportunity to obtain the write-off, the court will presumably relieve the defendant from some liability. Thus, the plaintiff receives less than he would have had the collateral source rule mandated a write-off award. The court relieves the defendant from $15,000 of liability-he ultimately pays $35,000. The plaintiff earns nothing, and Medicare is, again, at a $0 balance because it automatically subrogates the $35,000 paid to the medical service provider. The defendant, at least theoretically, pockets the medical service provider's $15,000 concession.
Even where courts have used the reasonable-value approach, they disagree as to what constitutes a "reasonable value." In defining "reasonable value," courts utilize three variations. First, the original amount billed by the medical service provider constitutes the reasonable value of the services. 251 Second, the first variation's antithesis: the reasonable value of the services does not include the write-off. 252 Third, both the amount billed by the medical service provider and the amount paid by the insurance company are relevant to a factual determination of the services' reasonable value. 253 However, criticisms focusing on the approach's consequent inconsistency are misplaced. While courts have applied this approach differently, a majority of jurisdictions has held that plaintiffs are entitled to the reasonable value of the services and that the original amount billed 
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by the medical service provider constitutes this value. 254 The ambiguous definition of "reasonable value" does not, in other words, cause these legal inconsistencies.
Rather, their bases lie in the courts' misunderstanding of the deterrence doctrine, a misconception of-or perhaps a failure to consider-the legislature's role in the public policy process, and a disregard of the collateral source rule's policies. Inconsistency is not an issue if one assumes the collateral source rule entitles plaintiffs to receive write-offs absent a legislative abrogation or modification of the rule. Otherwise, courts unjustly relieve the defendant from liability and significantly undermine the collateral source's underlying policies of deterrence and accountability.
C. The Kansas Constitution Does Not Preclude the Collateral Source
Rule's Abrogation
Thus far, this Comment has arrived at the following conclusion: Absent a legislative rejection of the collateral source rule's policies, deterrence and accountability demand a reasonable-value approach that allows courts to award plaintiffs the original amount billed by their medical service providers. This Subpart deals with an equally important question: Can the Kansas legislature constitutionally abrogate the rule? A recently published Note concludes that the Kansas legislature neither should, as a policy matter, nor can, as a constitutional matter, abrogate the rule. 255 Rather than answering whether the Kansas legislature should abrogate the rule, 256 this Comment explores whether the legislature can, pursuant to the Kansas Constitution, do so. Thus, this Subpart ultimately concludes that the legislature indeed possesses the constitutional power to abrogate the rule. 255. Young, supra note 3, at 167, 174. 256. Others have commented on this point. See generally Eaton, supra note 2 (surveying three unsuccessful attempts by the Kansas legislature to modify the Kansas collateral source rule); Young, supra note 3 (discussing the collateral source rule, the Kansas legislature's attempts to abrogate the rule, and probable impacts of such an abolition).
The Kansas Legislature Does Not Lack a Rational Basis to Abrogate the Collateral Source Rule
Proponents of tort reform propose "facts" of a medical malpractice crisis in support of the collateral source rule's abrogation. 257 Three notions fuel the perception of a medical malpractice crisis: First, both the number of tort claims and the resulting jury verdicts have astronomically increased; second, frivolous suits outnumber legitimate ones; and, third, doctors leave states without tort reforms because they cannot afford liability premiums. 258 According to one commentator, questionable evidence supports these claims. 259 The commentator notes that because this legislative purpose is no longer rational, the rule's abrogation cannot withstand constitutional scrutiny. 260 Yet such a criticism ignores other reasons to abrogate the rule; the argument's basic fallacy lies in its assumption that the inexistence of a medical malpractice crisis is the only rational basis to abrogate the rule.
This Comment does not question the commentator's conclusions regarding the inexistence of a medical malpractice crisis. What this Comment does question is her argument's disconnect between its evidence and conclusion. Though sufficient, the existence of a medical malpractice crisis is not a necessary rational basis in the abrogation's constitutional calculus. Assuming arguendo that the medical malpractice crisis is an unfounded perception, the legislative acknowledgement of a weakening of the collateral source rule's pillars of deterrence and accountability suffices as a rational basis for abrogation. The number of tort claims filed has actually decreased per capita over the last ten years. Additionally, the amounts awarded by juries have increased proportionally with increases in medical costs and general inflation. Proponents of tort reform have also failed to produce evidence of the purported "frivolous" lawsuits. the Kansas Supreme Court did not reach the issue of whether the challenged suit violated the right to a remedy. 264 Nonetheless, a holding that the Kansas Constitution entitles plaintiffs to the write-offs necessarily implies that the Kansas Constitution's right to a remedy requires courts to award the plaintiffs the double recovery imposed by the common law collateral source rule. Notwithstanding the rule's longstanding and well-settled common law doctrine, the Constitution neither expressly nor implicitly guarantees a double recovery.
The Collateral Source Rule's Abrogation Does Not Infringe on a Plaintiff's Equal Protection Guarantees
Neither would the collateral source rule's abrogation necessarily violate the Kansas Constitution's Equal Protection Clause. 265 Some have argued that allowing a jury to hear evidence of the plaintiff's insurance, but not evidence of the defendant's, "violates the Equal Protection Clause by treating litigants unequally." 266 The argument depends on the premise that admissibility of evidence of insurance would inevitably prejudice juries. 267 However, one can easily see the logical fallacy in this straw man. The soundness of this equal protection argument depends on a single premise: If the Kansas legislature abrogates the collateral source rule, courts must allow juries to hear the evidence of collateral sources. This assumption is at best questionable. In fact, the Kansas legislature may couple its abrogation with a caveat-only the court, not the jury, may 262 
D. Can a Statute Abrogating the Kansas Collateral Source Rule Survive
Constitutional Scrutiny?
The abrogation of the collateral source rule, because of its societal impact, is bound to encounter ardent legislative and judicial opposition. At the legislative level, the opposition's weapons will be its members' written and spoken words. However, a court's weapon is much more unyielding: the Kansas Constitution. 269 This Comment thus advises opponents of the collateral source rule to conduct an empirical study on the collateral source rule's impact on defendants. Otherwise, the collateral source rule could, as one commentator noted, face equal protection and rational basis challenges.
270
Senate Bill 335's last version allowed the jury to consider the plaintiff's collateral benefits in its determination but required the jury to itemize the verdict and the court to calculate the plaintiff's damages minus his net collateral benefits.
271
Had the bill passed, the Kansas Constitution would have likely invalidated this framework. 272 Allowing the jury to hear evidence of the plaintiff's insurance, even if the court conducts the final calculation, does not necessarily prevent jury prejudice against the plaintiff. The jury could, for example, compensate for the insurance on the plaintiff's noneconomic damages. Instead, this Comment advises opponents of the collateral source rule to include a 268. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.6303(1) (West 2000) (allowing the admissibility of collateral source benefits "to the court in which the action was brought after a verdict for the plaintiff and before a judgment is entered on the verdict" (emphasis added)); MINN. STAT clause that effectively prohibits juries from hearing evidence of collateral source rules and, instead, allows courts to calculate the final damages award after the jury verdict. 273 In light of the possible inexistence of a medical malpractice crisis, 274 a legislature seeking to abrogate the rule must equip itself with a solid rational basis. A policy shift away from deterrence and accountability may satisfy such a test. The hypothesis that the collateral source rule does not deter defendants anymore because their liability insurance generally pays for the plaintiff's damages constitutes a starting point. However, this hypothesis does not prove that the establishment of liability insurance has diluted the rule's rationales. Thus, this Comment calls for empirical research on the deterrent value of the rule and for a legislative balancing of, on one hand, both the collateral source rule's deterrent and accountability policies and, on the other, the societal impact of the rule's abrogation. A legislative finding that the collateral source rule lacks deterrent value and a rejection of its accountability rationale will likely constitute a rational basis to adequately withstand constitutional scrutiny.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Kansas collateral source rule has evoked at least four legislative battles. 275 In many states, the rule still stands, perhaps only as an archaic reminder that traditional deterrent and punitive policies may sometimes reign over what many consider common sense. In Kansas, this pattern is most evident in the context of Medicare and Medicaid, as the two programs have severely complicated the collateral source rule's application. 276 Pursuant to agreements between Medicare or Medicaid, on one hand, and the medical service provider, on the other, patients often receive discounted health care rates. Plaintiffs and defendants have taken hold of these write-offs and, whenever the issue arises, focus their debates on whether the plaintiff or the defendant ought to receive the windfall. These windfall sophisms-often adopted by courts-have convoluted the 273. See supra Part III.C.3 (noting this approach would likely withstand an equal protection challenge).
274. See Young, supra note 3, at 161-65 (arguing the nation is no longer experiencing a medical malpractice crisis).
275. However, until the Kansas legislature eliminates the collateral source rule, courts should respect its policies of deterrence and accountability. This does not imply, however, that the collateral source rule is constitutionally unyielding.
Rather, the legislative process will determine whether the Kansas rule stays or goes; the Kansas Constitution does not prevent the rule's abrogation, particularly if the legislature couples its rule with a legislative balancing, specifically noting that the societal impact on plaintiffs outweighs the perceived deterrence and accountability values of the rule. 278 Regardless, this decision befits a carefully reasoned legislative policy decision. Relevant considerations extend beyond the existence of a medical malpractice crisis or the rule's benefits to insurance companies. 279 To reach a sound and rational policy, the Kansas legislature must, first, consider empirical research on the Kansas rule's deterrence and accountability effects and, second, weigh both policy values against the expected adverse effects of the Kansas collateral source rule's abrogation. 279. In her Note, Young states the Kansas legislature should not partially abrogate the collateral source rule because a medical malpractice crisis does not exist and insurance companies would unfairly benefit at the expense of plaintiffs, resulting in a "grave societal impact." See Young, supra note 3, at 161-67. This Comment partially rebuts these arguments, noting that the legislature has the constitutional power to entirely abrogate the rule. See supra Part III.C.
